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IN THE SUPREME COURT Of THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN PECK, et ux. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
WILIAM REED JUDD, et ux. 
Defendants and Appellants 
Appellants' Brief 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8476 
Plaintiffs commenced this action to declare a 
forfeiture under a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
with the defendants, and for damages for unlawful 
detainer of the premises involved. The defendants 
alleged fraud in the original sale transaction under 
which the property was purchased. 
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The case came on for trial befor·e the court 
while the defendants were in possession of the real 
~roperty, and during the trial of the case a settle-
ment was attempted which resulted in the trial being 
suspended and a stipulation settling the matter was 
attempted to be worked out. 
The stipulation failed to materialize completely, 
however, possession of the entire premises, ·consisting 
of several rental units, was turned over to the plain-
tiff pursuant to the anticipated stipulation, and the 
defendants thereafter occupied only one of the rental 
units,. while the plaintiffs took possession of and 
operated the balance of the rental units. 
Thereafter, after the stipulation failed to settle 
the entire matter, the question of forfeiture and re-
tention of the entire sums paid in by the defendants 
to the plaintiffs as liquidated damages pursuant to 
the contract was brought on for trial. It is from the 
jt1dgment of the court enforcing the forfeiture and 
allo\Ying rete11tion by the _plaintiffs of the entire 
monies paid in by the defendants together ''ith the 
in1proven1ent~ on the property·, that the defendants 
appeal. It is tl1e defenda11ts position that to declare 
a fnrft"itur(' und('r the facts is improper and uncon-
~<-iona ble. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 )r'fendants purchased certain real property"\ de-
~crihed in the con1plaii1t"l fro111 tl1e plai11tiffs under a 
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written Uniform Real Estate Contract dated October 
25, 1950, agreeing to pay therefor the sum of $75,000. 
Defendants made a down payment of $10,700 and 
agreed to pay the sum of $600.00 per month there-
after part at 4 per cent interest and part at 5 per cent 
interest, together with the taxes after 1950. 
Although there was some question as to the 
actual crediting of certain payments made under the 
contract the undisputed fact is that defendants were 
unable to make their payments and were in arrears 
in their payments at the time suit vvas commenced. 
It appears that the total amount paid by the 
defendants to plaintiffs, including the down pay-
ment, was $36,933.82, which included the amount 
due from the defer1dants for taxes for the period they 
were in possession of the property. 
The property involved consists of five separate 
buildings, all of which are divided into rental units. 
The buildings are old, and a good deal of repairs, 
improvements and maintenance were necessary, a11rl 
the defendants performed a great deal of work a11d 
placed many improvements on the property. 
The plaintiffs introduced evidence at the trjal 
to establish the actual value of the premises at tl1e 
present time as $40,000.00 CTr. 6) on cross exan1-
ination plaintiff admitted that he had two other ap-
praisals of the property both of 'vhich v\·C'r0 ~nh-
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stantially higher than the exp.ert witness testified. 
Those appraisals vvere as follows $61,700.00, and 
$65,000.00 (Tr. 36, 37). The trial court found that 
the property was worth only $40,000, and that con-
sequently, when plaintiffs took the property back 
they suffered a loss of bargain of .some $35,000 
CR. 102). 
To arrive at the rental value of the property, in 
retrospect, and to establish that the plaintiffs had 
netted a fair return from their investment and more, 
the defendants sought to introduce evidence as to 
the improvements made by the defendants on the 
property, and their costs, and the costs of mainte-
nance of the property and operation thereof. The 
court refused to allow this evidence to be introduced 
and sustaining objections thereto. The figures sought 
to be introduced are before the court in the form 
of an offer of proof. CTr. Ex. 2+, 25). 
Those figures reveal that defendants spent 
$15"845 .33 011 permanent type improvements during 
their occupanc~r of the premises, and $20"529.59 on 
mail1tenance, 'Yitll" l1o,Yever" a great deal of the 
labor charged haYing been performed b~~ defendants. 
During th~ period of occupancy by the defend-
ants th<'~~ took in a total rental of $51"151.+9, which 
includes 1h~ apartme11t occtipied b~~ them. CTr. 78, 
H()" Hi). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in its ruling that the property has only a 
value of $40,000.00. 
II. The trial court erred in excluding defendants evidence as 
to improvements and maintenance costs. 
Ill. The trial court erred in declaring a forfeiture and allowing 
the plaintiff to retain all of the monies paid in by the 
defendants as liquidated damages, without regard to the 
excluded evidence. 
IV. If the contract is null and void as decreed by the court, then 
the trial court erred in not requiring a refund to the defend-
ants of the monies paid in by the defendants on the contract. 
V. The fact situation here involved did not iustify forfeiture 
under the law of the State of Utah. 
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POINT I 
The court erred in its ruling that the property has only 
a value of $40,000. 
The trial court found the value of the property 
to be only_ the sum of $40,000. The evidence on this 
subject came from an expert called by the plaintiffs, 
and from the plaintiff, Lorin Peck. Mr. Ashton tes-
tified that by the use of one method of appraisal he 
arrived at $40,000 (Tr. 44, 45) but that if in good 
shape it would be worth $50,000 (Tr. 44), and also, 
that by figuring the property on the basis of the total 
valuation of the land and the buildings, that he 
arrived at a total value of $54,863.00 (Tr. 50) 
The expert acknowledged that he did not see or 
know the condition of the property a year earlier 
\Yhen the defendants \Yere in possession of the prop-
erty (Tr. 51) and that to a large measure his reduced 
figure \Yas predicated upon the maintenance con-
rlitioil of th~ prope1i~~ at the time he sa\Y it, after 
it harl bPen back in the possession of the plaintiffs 
sf'Yf'rnl months (Tr. 31) 
1\ I r. .\~hton furtl1er stated at page 52 of the 
1 ra nscript: ~ .. ,,Then ~~ou get do,vn to putting it down 
10 n1a rk<'t Yaluf' it \Yould sell prett~~ close to $40,000 
to $ >0-~000-~ ~· a11d that the fair a11d reasonable market 
Ynhl<' \Y(Htld be ~ont<'\Yhere bet,vee11 those figures. 
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Mr. Peck the plaintiff, on cross examination 
admitted that he had Mr. Chapman, a realtor and 
the man who handled the Judd sale, appraise the 
property for him in December of 1956, which was 
the time the plaintiffs resumed operation of and 
possession of the property, and that Mr. Chapman 
appraised the property at $61,700, at that time. CTr. 
75) Mr. Peck also admitted that Mr. Turner of 
Turner Realty Co. had appraised the property for 
him in November or December, 1956, and that his 
appraisal was $65,000. CTr. 76) 
Either of the appraisals, that of Mr. Chapman, 
or that of Mr. Turner, were far above the figures 
given by Mr. Ashton, and both appraisals were made 
at the time the plaintiffs took the possession of the 
property back from the defenda11ts, and not at a 
subsequent time when the plaintiffs had bee11 in 
possession for some 15 months. 
It is respectfully submitted, that the \veight of 
evidence is definitely against the finding made by 
the trial court, and that the evidence establishes a 
value between $61,700 and $65,000 at the time wl1en 
the value bears an important relation to the issues 
here involved, that is, December, 195'3., when thP 
plaintiffs took possession of the property back from 
the defendants. 
The evidence of Mr. Ashton is remote in time 
he admitted an unfamiliarity with the property <1t 
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the time the possession passed from defendants to 
plaintiffs, and its condition at that time. This being 
the case, his evidence cannot be given the weight 
attributed to it in the face of the other appraisals. 
Yet another reason exists, however, why the 
finding of a value of $40,000 should not be allowed 
to stand. Mr. Ashton frankly admitted the market 
value was somewhere between $40,000 and $50,000, 
and by one method he arrived at a value in excess 
of $54,000. It is completely erroneous to utilize the 
absolute minimum figure Mr. Ashton placed on the 
property as being the market value in view of his 
repudiation of it as a fixed figure, and it is equally 
erroneous to seize upon the lowest possible figure 
cited by him in view of the wide latitude he gave 
in his figure. That is, somewhere between $40,000 
and $50,000. Such an estimate is not sufficiently 
close to justify the finding as made. 
POINT II 
The trial court erred in excluding defendants evidence 
as to improvements and maintenance costs. 
Defendants sought to introduce evidence as to 
the improvements placed upon the property herein 
involved, and to introduce evidence of tl1e mainte-
nance and operational costs both during the opera-
tion by the defendants and during the operation 
of the prop0rt~v by the plaintiffs. 
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On cross examination it was sought to be de-
veloped from the plaintiff, Mr. Peck, that his costs 
of operation had been compared to the income he 
received from the property. The purpose of this 
revenue of examination being to arrive at the net 
income from operation of the property to test this 
net income figure against the net income figure 
during defendants operation of the property to 
establish one of the important factors in a deter-
mination of whether the forfeiture here involved was 
unconscionable and exorbitant, that is, what was 
the property worth in producing revenue, since 
certainly the· seller would be entitled to claim that 
amount as being a figure which bore a reasonable 
relation to the actual damages which could reason-
ably be anticipated at the time the contract was 
made. Perkins vs. Spencer, 121 Ut. 468, 243 P. 2d 
446. 
The trial court sustained an_ objection to this line 
of questioning CTr. 29) and later when the same 
subject was attempted to be explored with the de-
fendant Mr. Judd, similar objections were sustained 
CTr. 51). 
The basis of the court's ruling was apparently 
that the term "fair rental value" was an art phrase 
with a definite and clear meaning, and that the no 
evidence would be admissible which would reach 
the question of income prodt1ced by the property. 
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In this line of reasoning, the appellants earnestly 
assert that the trial court completely misconceived 
the holding of this court in the Perkins vs. Spencer 
case, supra, and has missed the entire spirit of that 
case, and, that further, he erred on the question of 
admissibility of evidence to prove "fair rental value." 
First, a reading of the Utah cases uphelding 
liquidated damages, as well as those wherein a 
penalty was found to exist, reveals, running through-
out the cases the one basic proposition that, what is 
desired is that the injury sustained, if any, and the 
damages recovered therefor, bear a reasonable re-
lation to each other. Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. vs. 
Fiore, 47 Utah 108, 151 P. 984; Bramwell vs. Uggla, 
81 Utah 85, 16 P 2d 913, Perkins vs. Spencer, supra, 
and cases cited therein. 
The evidence admissible in the individual case 
to establish the relationship of reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the relationship of injury to tl1e 
forfeiture amount, varied in those cases, and in the 
very nature of the problem will vary from case to 
case. 
In the Perkins vs. Spencer case, \Yhich involved 
merely a single residence, it is obvious, that the 
rPntal value of the property provided a good, simple 
yard stick to determinP what the loss occasioned to 
the plaintiff was in relation to the montl1l~v payn1ents 
which had be('n madP. 
10 
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In Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. vs. Fiore, 47 Utah 
108, 151 P. 984, an entirely different basis was used, 
and in Croft vs. Jensen 86 Utah 13, 40 P. 2d 198, yet 
another type evidence was used; in Malmberg vs. 
Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975, the relatively short 
period of time of occupancy as co"mpared to the 
amount paid by the defendant. 
Without belaboring the point unduly, it appears 
that the trial court lost the spirit of the decisions 
and the rationale thereof in an attempt at technical 
application of a ruling to a fact situation which did 
not justify the ruling. 
In the present case, the paramount determina-
tion as to what revenue the plaintiffs were entitled 
to anticipate from the property to serve as a yard 
stick of reasonableness, was not the rental value of 
individual apartments, but the net income which 
a rental property could and would reasonably be 
expected to produce, together with any other factors 
which would serve to aid the determination of other 
gains or losses to the plaintiffs upon retaking the 
property. 
A detailed analysis of gross income and expenses 
is the only careful and practical way of arriving at 
the net income figure on the particular property, 
and this is what the defendants attempted to do, 
but were denied. 
11 
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To carry the analysis one step further, it is quite 
apparent, that the evidence of cost of operations and 
net profits to be derived from the operation of the 
property by the defendants (see defendants offer of 
proof) would have produced a more favorable set 
of figures than did those of plaintiffs expert witness. 
See Point I herein. His figures concluded a 45 
per cent net profit, whereas defendants figures as 
shown by exhibit 24, Coffer of proof) would indicate 
something in excess of 50 per cent profit. 
In this case the very nature of the property, its 
type, operation and upkeep problems made it im-
perative that the net income or revenue be used as 
the basic factor in determining whether the amount 
received by the plaintiffs from the defendants ex-
ceeded that which was reasonable. In refusing to 
allow this evidence to be introduced, it is earnestly 
submitted that the trial court erred seriously, and 
that the matter should be returned to the trial court 
for retrial, or for entry of judgment predicated upon 
defendants offers of proof. 
Yet another reason illustrating the fact that 
the trial court erred in his ruling excludin.g evidence 
is apparent. 
It is necessary to reconstruct in a case of this 
nature, since the parties vYere not contemplating a 
rental arrangement when the~r projected the agree-
ment into being. 1-IflnCf\ in retrospect, the problem 
12 
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is, "what is the best way to determine what a seller 
is entitled to expect from his property while in the 
hands of the buyer"? A synthetic situation has been 
created by reason of the lack of enforceability of the 
forfeiture provision, and therefore, it would seem 
that the interest of the court should be to consider 
that evidence which gives the most accurate forecast 
of these figures, rather than to try to fit a test to a 
particular case where it may not apply, as the court 
did in this instance. 
I-Iowever, assuming, but not conceding that the 
trial court was correct in con~luding that "rental 
value" must be used as a test in this case, the appel-
lants earnestly assert that the trial court still erred 
in his ruling. 
Ultimately, the point which the term "rental 
value" is seeking to reach is the determination of 
the value of the use of the land, or as stated in 
Nelson vs. Minneapolis & St. P. L. Ry. Co., 41 Minn. 
42 N.W. 788; 
"The term 'rental value' as applied to 
realty, is but another form of saying the 
value of the use of the land for any purpose 
for which adapted in the hands of a prudent 
and discreet occupant upon a judicious system 
of husbandry." 
Nor does it appear that the only test in determ-
ining "rental value" is testimony of what tl1e prop-
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erty would rent for. The case of Reeves vs. Romanes, 
132 Ark. 559, 201 S.W. 882 after indicating that 
rental value is to be ascertained by proof of what 
a property will rent for adds: 
" * * * or by evidence of other facts 
from which the fair rental value may be 
determined." 
to like effect, see Brewington vs. Laughran, 183 N.C. 
558, 112 S.E. 257. 
The problem involved here might well be likened 
to the situation where a loss of profit from the in-
terrogation of use of real property under a share 
crop arrangement, where uniformly the courts hold 
that the party is entitled to recover the value of the 
crops less the cost of raising, etc. Rice vs. Whitmore, 
74 Cal. 619, 16 P. 501; Colorado Nat. Bank vs. 
Ashcroft, 83 Colo. 136, 263 P. 23; and Rogers vs. 
McGuffey, 96 Tex. 565, 74 S.W. 753. 
It is earnestly asserted by the appellants that 
they were entitled under the theory of "other evi-
dence from which the reasonable rental value can 
be determined," to introduce the excluded evidence. 
A review of the evidence sougl1t to be introduced 
by the defendants (Ex. 24, 25-~ offer of proof Tr. 
50, 55) at once reveals the disproportionate and ex-
cessive penalty being extracted from the defendants. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT Ill 
The trial court erred in declaring a forfeiture and 
allowing the plaintiff to retain all of the monies paid 
in by the defendants as liquidated damages, without 
regard to the excluded evidence. 
Appellants re-assert their argument from Point 
II, that the evidence sought to be introduced by the 
defendants was proper, and that a consideration of 
it would result in the declaration that a penalty was 
imposed by the contract, rather than liquidated 
damages, but adds at this point the further argument, 
that the evidence, absent the excluded testimony, 
still requires the finding that a penalty was imposed 
rather than liquidated damages. 
The record shows that a total revenue of 
$51,151.49 was realized on the premises during the 
occupancy and operation thereof by the defendants. 
Mr. Ashton testified that the operating costs of prop-
erty of this type was 50 per cent of the gross income 
(Tr. 43) and that after deducting vacancy charges 
the net income would be 45 per cent. 
Applying this formula to the gross Income 
figure, there would be realized a net rettlrn of 
$23,018.17 on the property during the time it was in 
defendants possession. During that same period, 
the defendants paid to the plaintiffs the sum of 
15 
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$26,233.82. It is apparent, therefore, that the de-
fendant paid to the plaintiffs everything that the 
property could reasonably realize during the period 
that they had the property, and by plaintiffs own 
expert witness the net to be recovered from the 
property potentially in whomsoever's hands it would 
be operating would be less than the payments made 
to the plaintiffs by the defendants by some $3,215.65. 
Add to this the $10,700.00 down payment, and the 
disparity is at once apparent. 
To go even further, however, plaintiffs expert 
witness placed the net income from the property at 
$3,500..00 per year (Tr. 44), based upon his inves-
tigations of similar prop·erties and his information 
as to this property. This would make a total net of 
approximately $18,100.00 which would be antici-
pated from this property for the period the defend-
ants had the possession and operation thereof 
resulting in an even wider disparity between the 
yield of this property and the income received from 
it by the plaintiffs amounting to some $8,133.00. 
It is quite apparent, therefore, that the plaintiffs 
have been very handsomely repaid for the use the 
defendants have had of the property during the 
period they occupied a11d operated it, quite aside 
from the $10,700.00 do\Yll pa~v111ent made by the 
defendants. 
Using th0 highest val11e estimated on the real 
16 
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property at the time plaintiffs repossessed $65,000.00 
and the most favorable figures given by Mr. Ashton 
as to net profits from the property, (i.e.) $3,500.00 
per year (five years and two months) a total 
of $18,100.00, together with the down payment, 
$10,700.00, it is at once apparent that the plaintiffs 
have received much more than a reasonable return 
on the property, and much more than they would 
have realized had they operated the property 
themselves. 
It is earnestly asserted by the appellants that 
the evidence clearly indicates that a penalty is here 
imposed under the facts in evidence and that it 
would constitute an extreme penalty to allow the 
plaintiffs to retain the $36,933.82 paid to plaintiffs 
by the defendants, and also allow the plaintiffs to 
recover the property. 
To allow such a result is to completely abrogate 
the principles laid down heretofore by this court 
several times, and more particularly in the case 
Perkins vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446, 
wherein the court said: 
" * * * where enforcement of the forfeiture 
provision would allow an unconscionable and 
exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable 
relationship to · the actual damages suffered, 
we have uniformly held it to be unenforcc-
a ble." 
17 
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Certainly tl1e recovery to the plaintiffs is so 
exorbitant and unconscionable bears no reasonable 
relationship to the damages suffered, and hence, 
the provision of the contract should be held to be 
11nenforcea ble. 
POINT IV 
If the contract is null and void as decreed by the 
court, then the trial court erred in not requiring a refund 
to the defendants of the monies paid in by the defend-
ants on the contract. 
At this point appellants assert that if the con-
tract of the parties is null and void as the court 
decreed, and wholly ineffective for any purpose as 
the court decreed, then the plaintiffs (respondents) 
cannot in the very nature of the relationship that 
the parties are placed retain monies paid in by the 
defendants under that contract, and can at best 
only recover damages for the use and occupancy 
of the premises or such other damages as they might 
be able to prove, and that since they proved no such 
damages, it was error for the court to find in favor 
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants allow-
ing the plaintiffs to retain all of the monies 
paid in. l\1almberg vs. Baugh .. 62 Utah 331, 218 
Pac. 975. 
ThE:l dE:ltE:lr1ni11ation tl1at the contract 'Yas and 
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is null and void and of no force and effect is tanta-
mount to a determination that no contract exists or 
existed under such circumstances it is not consistent 
nor possible for the court to allow the enforcement 
of provisions of that contract against the appellants, 
and the trial court therefore erred in ruling as it 
did in paragraph 6 of the judgment. Paragraphs 
4 and 5 of the judgment are so wholly inconsistent 
that they cannot stand. 
POINT V 
The fact situation here involved did not iustify 
forfeiture under the law of the State of Utah. 
The case Perkins vs. Spencer, 1.21 Utah 468, 243 
P. 2d 446, collates the Utah cases on this subject, 
and makes the following observation: 
"It will be observed that in all cases 
where the stipulation for liquidated damages 
was enforced it bore some reasonable relation 
to the actual damages which could reasonably 
be anticipated at the time the contract 
was made and was not a forfeiture which 
would allow an unconscionable and exorbi-
tant recovery." 
The court also quotes with approval the Re-
statement of Contracts, Section 339, as follows: 
" ( 1) an agreement, made in advance of 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
breach, fixing the damages. therefor, IS not 
enforceable as a contract and does not 
affect the damages recoverable for the breach, 
unless · 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable 
forecast of just compensation for the harm 
that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach 
is one that is incapable or very difficult of 
accurate estimation." 
The court also quotes approvingly from Williston 
on Contracts, Rev. Ed. Section 779, p. 2191 to the 
same effect. 
It is apparent therefore, that the provision in the 
instant contract cannot stand as enforceable, since 
it meets neither the (a) or. the (b) arm of the 
proposition as stated above. 
The provision of the contract here involved 
(Ex. 5, first par. on reverse side) is as follows: 
4ll .. ':-: 
" * * * all payments which have been 
made theretofore on this contract by the 
Buyer, shall be forfeited to· ,·the Seller as 
liquidated damages for the non-performances 
of the contract, * * *." 
The provision quoted obvinusly· does not even 
consider the question of 'Yhat is a reasonbale fore-
cast of just co1npensation, since by its terms it 
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would apply to a situation where 99 per cent had 
been paid as readily as to a situation where only 
one per cent had been paid. 
Nor can it qualify as a situation where the 
harm caused by the breach is incapable or very 
difficult of accurate estimation, since in the very 
nature of the transaction involved, . an accurate 
forecast is not only possible, but is easily made. 
It is earnestly urged by the appellants, that 
the contract provision here involved cannot be sus-
tained under the facts of the case, and in view of 
the nature of the transaction and the language of 
the contract proVIsion. 
CONCLUSION 
It is earnestly submitted by the appellants, and 
urged upon this court, that the trial court erred in 
allowing a forfeiture in this case under the facts 
and la"v, that in doing so he has allowed the very 
inequity to be f9stered which the Utah cases cited 
herein have been decided to prevent. Further, that 
the errors of the trial court justify a reversal of the 
case for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorney for Appellants 
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